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A B S T R AC T
The field of expertise is mired in a nature vs. nurture debate. Despite what we now know from be-
havioral genetics research about the underpinnings of human behavior, some expertise theorists 
continue to deny or downplay the importance of genetic factors (“innate talent”) in expert perfor-
mance. In this commentary, we argue that this viewpoint is neither defensible nor productive. Our 
argument is based on two observations. First, there are always limits on human performance, even 
among individuals who have engaged in long periods of intensive training. Second, grounded in a 
neurobiological system that has evolved through natural selection, variation across people in phe-
notypes reflecting these limits will have a genetic component. We comment on directions for future 
research to advance the field of expertise. 
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The scientific debate about whether innate talent plays a role in 
expert performance began more than a century and a half ago. 
Showing that eminent individuals tended to be biologically re-
lated, Sir Francis Galton (1869) argued in his book Hereditary 
Genius that greatness arises from “natural ability”. The Swiss 
botanist Alphonse Pyrame de Candolle (1873), presenting his 
own data, countered that causes favorables—advantages such 
as wealth, education, and even a temperate climate—are the 
major factors in success. The debate has raged on ever since. 
It is a bit perplexing that we are still having this debate. Other 
fields long ago embraced the idea that nature and nurture, and 
their interplay, contribute to variation in human behavior. We 
are decades past any serious debate about whether traits such 
as intelligence, personality, and psychopathology are heritable 
(they are—substantially so). Nearly twenty years ago, the be-
havioral geneticist Eric Turkheimer (2000) wrote, “The nature-
nurture debate is over. The bottom-line is that everything 
is heritable” (p. 160). Yet, here we are, having a debate about 
whether innate talent is a valid concept.
To be clear, no credible scientist believes that expert perfor-
mance can be explained without recourse to nurture (i.e., the 
environment). This is because the type of specialized knowl-
edge necessary for activities such as chess, music, and sports 
can only be acquired through some form of environmental ex-
posure (i.e., training and other activities). We don’t come into 
the world as “blank slates,” but we certainly aren’t born knowing 
the rules of chess, much less the Queen’s Gambit. 
Nevertheless, the view that expert performance can be ex-
plained without recourse to talent remains popular in both sci-
entific and popular circles. John Watson (1924), the founder of 
behaviorism, famously guaranteed he could train any healthy 
infant to become “any type of specialist …regardless of his 
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 talents” (p. 104). More recently, K. Anders Ericsson (2007) wrote, 
“it is possible to account for the development of elite perfor-
mance among healthy children without recourse to unique tal-
ent (genetic endowment)” (p. 4). This view has been promoted 
in popular books on expertise, such as Talent is Overrated: What 
Really Separates World-Class Performers from Everybody Else 
(Colvin, 2010), The Talent Code: Greatness Isn’t Born. It’s Made. 
Here’s How (Coyle, 2009), and Peak: Secrets from the New Sci-
ence of Expertise (Ericsson & Pool, 2016). The psychologist Scott 
Miller (2011) blogged, “What is widely believed however is not 
always true: flat earth, phrenology, cold fusion, and…innate 
talent.”
The question of why the field of expertise remains mired in a 
nature vs. nurture debate while other fields have progressed 
is interesting to consider. Dogma dies hard, perhaps. However, 
this is a question for historians of science. Here, in this com-
mentary on Joseph Baker and Nick Wattie’s thoughtful target 
article, we offer our perspective on talent and thoughts on how 
to advance the field of expertise. 
The Inevitability of Heritability
A decade before Galton published Hereditary Genius (1869), his 
half-cousin Charles Darwin published On the Origin of Species 
(1859). Darwin’s revolutionary insight was that populations 
evolve through natural selection: the differential survival of 
members of a population based on differences in their charac-
teristics. The upshot of natural selection is a discovery so robust 
that it has been dubbed the First Law of Behavioral Genetics 
(Turkheimer, 2000): if a behavioral characteristic (a phenotype) 
varies across people, there will be some contribution of genetic 
factors to that variation (Plomin, DeFries, Knopik, & Neiderhiser, 
2016; Sela & Barbaro, 2018).
In view of this discovery, it would seem odd to argue that ex-
pert performance can be explained without recourse to ge-
netic endowment—and it is odd. Through training, people can 
develop skills that enable them to circumvent normal limits on 
human performance (Ericsson, 2014; Ericsson & Pool, 2016). 
This is not a controversial claim; this is the only sensible way 
to explain the feats of elite performers. Take “memory athletes” 
such as Lance Tschirhart, who holds the world record for mem-
orizing random digits (at a bewildering 456; World-Memory-
Statistics.com, 2016). Tschirhart is not holding 456 digits in his 
short-term memory; rather, through training, he has acquired 
skill in storing digits in long-term memory (see Ericsson, Chase, 
& Faloon, 1980). 
However, just because people can circumvent limits on perfor-
mance does not mean that performance is without limits. There 
are always limits on human performance (and, for that matter, 
the performance of artificial systems such as Deep Blue). Cir-
cumvent one limit, and there will be others. Moreover, reflect-
ing a neurobiological system that has evolved through natu-
ral selection, there will be heritable variation across people in 
phenotypes indexing those limits, whether they be cognitive 
phenotypes such as working memory, physical phenotypes 
such as height, neurological phenotypes such as white matter 
integrity, physiological phenotypes such as maximal oxygen 
uptake (VO2max), or whatever. The level of these phenotypes 
will have an impact on a person’s development in a domain (or 
lack thereof ). Basketball and height is only the most obvious 
 example: there have been only three players 5-feet-6 or shorter 
in NBA history (“24 Shortest NBA Players”).
In short, there is no plausible reason to deny that talent impacts 
expert performance. All the same, it is important to ask what, 
exactly, talent is; otherwise, it might as well not exist because 
it can’t be measured. Baker and Wattie (2019) provide a use-
ful discussion. Along the lines just discussed, they argue that 
talent is a valid concept, because it must be: “An evolution-
ary probabilistic standpoint assumes there is a distribution of 
ability and/or individual characteristics (i.e., degrees of talent) 
across a population with very small numbers of individuals at 
the very highest and lowest levels” (Baker & Wattie, 2019, p. 4).
They add, however, that “with the exception of a few variables 
related to body size, no robust indicators of talent currently 
exist” (p. 7). We are surprised by this claim. Numerous twin 
studies have found moderate-to-large heritability estimates 
for sports-relevant physiological characteristics. For example, 
a recent meta-analysis found average heritability of 59% for 
VO2max (Schutte, Nederend, Hudziak, Bartels, & de Geus, 2016). 
VO2max can be increased with training (see, e.g., Skinner et al., 
2001), but so can many highly heritable phenotypes (e.g., mus-
cle mass; Aagaard et al., 2004; Georgiades, Klissouras, Baulch, 
Wang, & Pitsiladis, 2017). Heritability and modifiability are inde-
pendent considerations. 
Intellectual Talent
We further note that psychologists discovered a robust indica-
tor of intellectual talent well over a century ago. Given a rea-
sonably large and representative sample of subjects, scores on 
tests of different cognitive abilities will correlate positively with 
each other, implying the existence of a general factor of intel-
ligence (Jensen, 1998). This “g” factor is one of the most replicat-
ed findings in psychological science. Three things about g are 
clear (see Ritchie, 2015). First, there is just one g. Correlations 
between estimates of g extracted from different test batteries 
are near 1.0 (Johnson, Bouchard, Krueger, McGue, & Gottes-
man, 2004). Second, g is stable across time. A person high in 
g in childhood will likely be so for the rest of their life (Deary, 
Whalley, Lemmon, Crawford, & Starr, 2000). Finally, g has prac-
tical utility. It predicts socially relevant outcomes such as aca-
demic achievement and job performance better than any other 
single variable (Schmidt & Hunter, 2004). 
There is relatively little evidence for the role of g in developing 
sports expertise. Significant correlations between measures 
of cognitive ability and sports performance have sometimes 
been observed, but just as often not (see Hambrick, Burgoyne, 
& Oswald, 2019, for a review). Nevertheless, we think that a con-
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sideration of the role of innate talent in sports expertise must 
include g. The question of why g sometimes predicts sports 
performance, but other times not, is particularly interesting. It 
could be that g predicts performance in individual sports but 
not group sports in which team-level factors may compensate 
for individual-level factors. Research aimed at answering this 
type of question will enrich our understanding both of g as a 
form of intellectual talent, and of the underpinnings of sports 
expertise. 
Conclusion
Research on the nature and nurture of complex skill will move 
the field of expertise ahead. The knowledge gained from this 
research will provide a scientific foundation for accelerating the 
acquisition of expert performance. For example, as is already 
being done in sports, it may one day be possible to tailor train-
ing in domains such as music based on performers’ genotypes. 
Far from limiting people’s potential, this type of intervention 
will bring expert performance within reach of more people 
than is currently the case.
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